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purposes-again to use Frey's1anguage and emphasis--that is what we want, and many philosophers have
bravely stepped forward to reassure us that since the
quality and value of (normal) human life are
"incomparably beyond" those of any mere animal, "the
way is open" for us to kill these inferior life forms as
we need and want to in pursuit of the wonderfully "rich,
full life" of a (normal) human being. 3
Autonomy is something we humans have frequently
felt we were unique in possessing, and our philosophers
have repeatedly reminded us how pre-eminently worthy
being autonomous makes us. According to Frey,
autonomy gives a "further dimension of value to our
lives" by adding the happiness of a "strong sense of
achievement" to what would otherwise be a "mere
record of the satisfaction of fIrst-order desires and
appetites."4 Frey thus gives a hedonistic reason for
believing that autonomous beings are more valuable
than nonautonomous beings. One could also (or
alternatively) offer deontological and altruistic reasons
for that evaluation: Kantians claim that only
autonomous agents are capable of recognizing and
acting out of respect for the moral law, and utilitarians
could argue that only autonomous agents are capable
of escaping the repetitive cycles of nature to improve
the general welfare. Such reasons raise a myriad of
questions, including the one with which Professor
Comstock has dealt: Does autonomy, as Frey has
characterized it, have the "crucial moral signiflcance"s
he attributes to it? I have three contributions I would
like to make to that line of questioning.
First, Bentham noted seven dimensions of hedonistic
values: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity,
fecundity, purity, and extent. 6 Like John Stuart Mm, in
chapter II of Utilitarianism, Frey wants to add an eighth
dimension, quality, to this list. However, he does notin his writings with which I am familiar--explain how
this eighth dimension relates to the other seven. Would
he have it, as Mill did, thatthe accomplishment of even
one little reflective project is preferable to even the
greatest fulfillment of unreflective desires and appetites?
For example, would Frey maintain that the sense of
achievement at completing one's plans to clean out the
rain gutters is preferable to any amount ofpleasure from
sex, fine wine, good food, or other sensual sources? If
so, he has a heavy burden ofjustifIcation to shoulder in
order to render such an incredible conclusion credible.
But ifnot, then there may be autonomous lives that are
not as valuable as nonautonomous lives filled with
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In debating the question of animal liberation it has
been my experience, if! may paraphrase Frey, that most
people feel that (normal) human life is of a much higher
quality than animal life and that since the value of life
is a function of its quality, animal life does not have the
same value as (normal) human life. Indeed, most people
feel that we are something of a special or a privileged
class against which the lives of others are viewed and
their value assessed. I
It is not surprising that we feel this way. As Donald
Griffin has pointed out, "it seems plausible that animals
would be more likely to survive and reproduce if their
beliefs included confident faith in their own superiority
and the assurance that exploiting other species was
normal and correct behavior."2 Historically, religion,
literature, and philosophy have been extensively
engaged in reinforcing this instinctual faith in the preeminent worth and privilege of humanity. It has been
their task to find and warmly extol those things which
distinguish us from those "mere animals" we want to
drive off the land, kill, eat, wear, and otherwise exploit
and destroy to fulfill our needs and wants. It has been
their job to keep our consciences clear as we bestride
the world, using our overwhelming might to take
control, mold the world to satisfy our idea of the good
life, and kill off those who stand in our way. Selffulfillment, accomplishing our plans, achieving our
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must have been arrived at by these people either (1)
imagining how it would feel to live the life of a dog, a
chicken, or some other nonautonomous being (the dog
and chicken are Frey's candidates for nonautonomy7)
or (2) contemplating these nonautonomous lives the
way one would a tree, painting, or other object and
noting the properties those lives have when thus
externally examined.
If the evaluation is based on how these philosophers
imagine they would feel if they had to live a dog's
life, then these philosophers are employing their
imaginations to commit the same sort of category
mistake discussed above. The image one has here is
that of a prisoner, a consciousness which is capable of
doing a variety of things confined to a way of life which
does not permit her to actualize those capacities,
although she remains aware of these capacities and feels
frustrated by the lack of opportunity to actualize them.
However touching, this image has nothing to do with
the actual, lived quality and value of the life of a dog.
The actual,lived quality and value of a way oflife must
(logically) be the quality and value that way of life was
for the individual actually living it. Consequently, if
we hold, as seems reasonable, that the quality and value
of a way of life depend on how it fulfills or frustrates
capabilities, we must remember that the relevant
capabilities are those of the individual actually living
the life. For example, it is how a dog's way of life
actually fulfills or frustrates the dog's capacities, not
how it would fulfill or frustrate the capacities of some
Anglo-American philosopher, that contributes to its
actual, lived quality and value.
It follows that to determine whether a human life
actually has higher Iived quality and value than a dog's,
one must compare the quality and value the human life
has for its human subject with the quality and value the
dog's life has for its canine subject. Colloquially, in
order to determine whether the happiness of a happy
human life is of a quality superior to the happiness of a
happy canine life, we would need to compare the
happiness our way of life provides us with the happiness
the dog's way of life provides the dog. In order to make
that comparison, we would have to feel the happiness
the dog derives from his life and compare that with the
happiness we derive from ours. Since we are not dogs,
we cannot do that. Although we can tell, from his
behavior, that a dog is happy, we cannot feel the
happiness of a happy dog and, consequently, cannot
compare its quality to that of the happiness we

reliable, ready-to-hand, pure, intense, enduring, fecund,
or extensive happiness. Thus, Frey must either embrace
some incredible comparisons or concede that a sense
of achievement need not make a life something of
immensely greater value than a life of satisfied desires
and appetites.
Second, dedicated empiricist that he was, Mill held
that the only way to tell whether X is qualitatively
superior to Y is to ask someone who has experienced
both which she prefers. But no one can experience
both an autonomous and a nonautonomous life.
Consequently, unless a credible, nonexperiential way
of assessing the quality of life can be found, the question
of whether an autonomous or nonautonomous life is of
greater quality and value is unanswerable and, many
would conclude, therefore cognitively meaningless.
Sometimes the meaninglessness of comparing the
quality of autonomous and nonautonomous lives goes
unrecognized because a nonautonomous life, i.e., the
life of a being lacking the capacity for autonomy, is
confused with a life in which a being capable of
autonomy is not able to actualize that potentiality. For
instance, a person who spends part of her life dominated
by strong-willed parents but who eventually goes on to
hold her own values and way of life may report that
she prefers the latter, self-determined way of life. And
this may be cited as evidence that an autonomous life
is preferable to a nonautonomous life. But that would
be a category mistake: In discussions of human vs.
nonhuman lives, the contrast between autonomy and
nonautonomy refers to differing capacities, whereas the
alternatives in the case of the liberated woman refer to
different actualizations of the same capacities.
Therefore, what a human being can report on, namely,
the undesirability of a life in which her capacities for
autonomy go unfulfilled, is irrelevant to determining
whether an autonomous, human life is preferable to a
nonautonomous, animal life, since the latter is a life
led by a being who is incapable of autonomy and,
consequently, can have all his capabilities fulfilled in a
nonautonomous life.
Let me pursue this crucial point a bit further, with
an eye to the origin of values. When something is said
to have value, it is always meaningful to ask, "For
whom?" So, for whom is the value of an autonomous
life greater than that of a nonautonomous life? Frey's
answer is, apparently, for some moral philosophers,
especially some Anglo-American moral philosophers.
Now, this evaluation, if arrived at reflectively at all,

Winter 1992

31

Between the Species

Sapontzis: Response to Comstock

Based on the discussions of moral relativism I have
published elsewhere,9 I would argue that such a
demonstration cannot be provided. Since values depend
on valuers for their existence and since valuers are so
diverse, there is no nonarbitrary way of showing that
what one group of valuers prefers in life provides the
"true," "basic," "superior," or otherwise definitive
evaluation of lives. Nonarbitrary comparisons of the
quality and value of ways of life are limited to evaluating
alternative ways of life for the same (sort of) subject,
as when we determine that life in a battery cage is less
fulfilling for chickens than a free-roaming life or that
spontaneous, intuitive lives are less fulfilling for AngloAmerican philosophers than are self-controlled,
reflective lives.
Finally, at one point Frey does go beyond warmly
reciting his preferences to offering us one reason why
autonom y is of "crucial moral significance in killing:"
An autonomous being is "able to see itself as existing
over time, able to have desires with respect to the
future, including the desire to go on living, and able,
therefore, to have these desires frustrated. "10
Apparently, Frey intends "crucial moral significance"
here to mean something like "necessary condition for
making killing morally significant," since he
concludes that "the way is open" to killing those who
lack the ability to have such desires and to experience
such frustration.
Since I have refuted this sort of contention at length
elsewhere,l1 let me here just quickly mention one
serious, logical problem with it. The difficulty is that
even if frustrating plans for the future and a desire to
live are morally significant matters, it does not follow
that depriving a nonautonomous being of the rest of its
life, thereby depriving it of any chance at further
happiness, is not also a morally significant matter.
Therefore, it does not follow that "the way is open" to
killing nonautonomous beings.
This may be overlooked, since using the word
"frustrated" suggests that killing autonomous beings is
morally crucial because they experience feelings of
frustration at having the fulfillment of their desires
blocked by being killed. Nonautonomous beings,
supposedly lacking plans for the future, could not
experience such feelings of frustration at being killed.
However, such an analysis of the moral significance of
killing would open the way to killing autonomous
beings in ways which do not cause them feelings of
frustration, e.g., killing them in their sleep. Since that

experience. For example, since we cannot feel the dog's
excitement at running along the beach, we cannot
compare the quality of his happiness to the quality of
our sense of fulfillment at solving a tricky logic problem
and determine which is the qualitatively superior
happiness. Consequently, we cannot tell whether a
fulfilling life for a dog is qualitatively less happy than
a fulfilling life for a human. Thus, assertions that a
human life possesses superior actual, lived quality and
value must (logically) be merely confused, rhetorical
flourishes, devoid of cognitive content. 8 .
But it may not be actual, lived quality and value
that Frey and his fellow anthropophiles have in mind.
When they assert that autonomous life has a higher
quality and value than nonautonomous life, they may
mean merely that it has a preponderance of the qualities
they prefer. The situation would be like that of someone
who holds that the music of Beethoven is qualitatively
superior to that of the Beatles: the valuer has certain
qualities he prefers in music, and he finds more of
them in Fidelio than in The Yellow Submarine. On
this interpretation, when Frey's Anglo-American
philosophers hold that autonomous life is qualitatively
superior to nonautonomous life, this is to be understood
. as asserting that these philosophers have certain
qualities they prefer in a way of life, and they find
more of them in autonomous than in nonautonomous
ways of life.
Now, we philosophers have long believed that we are
"the measure of all things," smugly certain that "the
unexamined life is not worth living" and that Socrates
and his acolytes through the centuries have most closely
approached the ideal human life and, consequently, the
ideal of all life. Nevertheless, the conceit of holding that
"the way is open" to killing others because their way of
life does not possess the qualities preferred by a group of
moral (!) philosophers is particularly appalling. As
Comstock has shown, and Christ, Rousseau, Kierkegaard,
Faulkner, and many others confirm, Frey's preferences
are not shared by all normal, adult humans, nor even by
all humans who have reflected sensitively on the human
condition. They are doubtless not shared by nonautonomous beings. Given this diversity of preferences, it
would seem incumbent on Frey-especially since he
wants to make the qualities he prefers into life-or-death
criteria-to demonstrate that his preferences are the
"true," "basic," "superior," or otherwise definitive criteria
for evaluating the quality and value of life. I am not
aware that he has even attempted to do this.
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II See S. F. Sapontzis, "Must we Value Life to Have a
Right to It?," Ethics and Animals 3/1 (1982), and Morals.
Reason, andAnimals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987), chapter 9.

is, presumably, an unacceptable conclusion, the moral
significance of killing autonomous beings must lie in
the blocking of the fulfillment of their desires, whether
or not they realize those desires are being blocked. This
suggests that there is not a morally crucial difference
between killing a being with desires for the future and
killing a being lacking such desires.
In conclusion, I would like to comment on the idea
that because there is a "further dimension of val ue to
our lives,"t2 "the way is open to the killing of animals."
It is not obvious that A's being superior to B entitles A
to kill or otherwise exploit B. The teachings of Christ
and the extra burdens placed on the philosopher-kings
ofPlato's Republic suggest the contrary. Consequently,
"firmly resisting any egalitarianism over the value of
life"t3 should (logically) not be confused with opening
the way to killing or otherwise exploiting animals.
Justifying that opening requires not only demonstrating
superiority, which Frey has tried but failed to do; it also
requires demonstrating that superiority provides a
license to exploit and kill, which Frey has had the good
sense not even to try to do.

t2 Frey, p. 56.
13

Frey, p. 56.
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